this reconsideration, we suggest, has already begun. recent empirical scholarship on the american state-exemplified here by the work of Jacob Hacker and Kimberley Johnson-offers more nuanced accounts of the american state's form and development, accounts that stretch the notion of the state beyond the national government's central administrative apparatus to include state and local governments and even apparently "private" organizations that are not conventionally considered to be part of the state at all. at the same time, the standard comparative template of the state (against which american state building has typically been measured) is shifting. Just as the revival of the state as an object of theoretical and empirical interest, led by theda skocpol and others, was under way in the 1970s and 1980s, countervailing trends, especially the growth of international economic interdependence and transnational norms of rights, potentially heralded the state's demise as the essential unit of global politics in the face of seemingly porous national borders. such anticipation now seems premature. an emerging theoretical perspective in comparative state researchrepresented by grzymała-Busse and Ziblatt-has begun to parse the paradox of the state's resilience in the face of the forces that threatened to marginalize it.
these new directions in the american and comparative literatures on the state, we suggest, parallel each other quite closely. Both address similar questions: how does the state evolve and succeed without the traditional elements of state building or the customary apparatus of power and authority? and both propose similar answers, focusing on the importance of structures and processes that are conventionally considered to be antagonistic to the growth and operation of successful states. Collectively, these scholars and others are retheorizing the state -developing a suppler, multidimensional picture of the state's origins, 3 nettl 1968. nettl was quite explicit about his view of the united states as stateless: "an american sociopolitical self-examination simply leaves no room for any valid notion of the state" (p. 561). structure, and consequences-to shed light on the reasons for the state's stubborn refusal to cede the stage.
In this article we suggest that these parallel scholarly developments have much in common and a good deal to teach each other. the emerging understanding of the state that we describe provides a framework not only for revisiting the state in the international realm but also, in dialogue with recent americanist studies, for revising and deepening our understanding of the state's paradoxical role in american political development. the very comparative literature that once found the united states to be "stateless," following J. P. nettl's classic paper on the state as a multidimensional conceptual variable, ironically provides the basis upon which to build an alternative perspective on the american state, enriched by comparative insights. 3 In this emerging view, american state building, strength, and institutional capacity form through links with society, not necessarily by virtue of autonomy from society. But such distinctive patterns provide insights for comparative studies too, for instance, in respect to the relationship between the state and the welfare state across nations.
the works under review here present a series of such perspectives on the state and state building that highlights numerous alternative, ironic causal pathways and hypotheses about the origins and development of the state. these works, which vary in their coverage of time periods and regions of the world, connect the state creatively and usefully to social and political structures that have often been disconnected from studies of the state, especially in accounts of american politics. they view the state not as a counterweight or rival to other, typically "nonstate" patterns of social relations or political organization, but rather as intimately connected with those patterns-such as negotiated arrangements between the central government and powerful subnational units (Ziblatt and Johnson), patterns of competition and contestation among political parties (grzymała-Busse), and relations among "public" and "private" providers of social welfare (Hacker) . Before addressing these works in some detail, we briefly survey the general comparative literature on the state and then examine the parallel challenges and ironies of the state in american political development. our ensuing discussion of the books under review leads us to suggest how the multidimensional reconceptualization of the state that we identify might help to resolve the paradoxes of the american state and how american patterns offer comparative lessons.
the premature demise of the state Contrary to the brave new world many expected in the wake of globalization and global economic integration-a world in which the ability of states to exercise control over the territories, populations, and economies contained within national boundaries would atrophy in the face of economic interdependence-the state is doggedly present. some states have doubtless ceded some of their autonomy to suprastate entities, whether through trade agreements (such as naf ta or mercosur) or binding legal and political integration (such as the european union). elsewhere in the world, states increasingly share political primacy with nonstate entities that are bereft of territorial sovereignty but nevertheless perform some combination of governance functions from social services to armed force and that often enjoy substantial popular support and civil-society penetration (such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the taliban, and even al-Qaeda). at the same time, however, new states such as Kosovo continue to form, especially in the wake of the breakup of the soviet empire, and old states continue to do (or at least try to do) many of the things states have traditionally done: maintain order, provide protection, and manage the economy, among other things.
Correspondingly, there is now a resurgence of the state (and a broadening of the idea of the state and state building) in the comparative politics and international relations literatures. Indeed the state has been adjoined with a series of new adjectives such as the "postcolonial state," "postcommunist state," "postconflict state," "post-cold war state," "failed state," and "collapsed state." Connecting these new descriptions is the centrality of the state as both (1) an empirical institution that fails or succeeds at developing activities with enormous political consequences and (2) a theoretical concept essential for organizing systematic comparative analysis.
materially, it is impossible to look at the modern world order and not recognize the overwhelming significance of the state as an institutional force. at present, and especially post-9/11, the notion of growing statelessness in the international system and the global economy has evaporated. gone are the days (as in early years of the Washington consensus) when analysts could prophesy, champions could celebrate, and skeptics could anguish over the eventual withering away of the state in the face of the onward march of globalization. 4 this empirical and theoretical centrality vindicates the project to "bring the state back in" in the 1970s and 1980s, sponsored by the social science research Council (ssrc) and led by theda skocpol, Ira Katznelson, and others. In reaction to the society-and class-centered analyses of marxism and modernization theory, this move prompted a new focus on the potential autonomy of the state from class or other group interests, as well as on the state's variable capacity to bring about the desired ends of those who occupied its offices.
5 this scholarship on the revival of the state employed a Weberian framework as its core concept, which emphasized the expansion of centralized bureaucratic structures as they penetrated a polity's geographic jurisdiction.
6 these accounts revolve around such activities as tax gathering to fund war mobilization, the imposition of a common language to forge national identity, and the routinized administration of public services evolving from the modesty of the postal service into the modern regulatory and welfare state regime.
7 But this model is less relevant to efforts to theorize contemporary states. this model saw the state as forged primarily in the crucible of territorial conflict and wars hot and cold, and it was not clear how the modern nation-states that skocpol and her collaborators so penetratingly analyzed would fare in the emerging era of increasing economic integration. nor was it clear whether the model would be capacious enough to explain the variety of state forms or the myriad pathways to state building in the post-cold war, postcolonial world-whether, in short, the autonomy and capacity of states would remain robust or whether this was an owl-of-minerva moment. 8 Indeed, many states are experiencing difficulty, facing economic failure or external or internal threats to their endurance (even if the proposition that the very organizing notion of the state is under threat seems overstated).
9 there is, for instance, an important debate about the extent to which national welfare state arrangements are threatened and restructured under pressure from global trends. the logic of globalization seemed to suggest that because national economies are growing less self-contained, costly welfare states and heavy regulatory regimes at the national level would drive capital away to the detriment of national economic performance. In order to maintain growth, then, it was expected that national governments would seek to retrench welfare states and deregulate markets. the journalist thomas friedman has 5 evans, rueschemeyer, and skocpol 1985. see especially skocpol's introduction to the volume. 6 a conception echoing back to the influential work on political development sponsored by the ssrc Committee on Comparative Politics in the 1960s and 1970s. see Binder et al. 1971 . see also Badie and Birnbaum 1983. 7 see tilly 1975. 8 see gartzke 2007. 9 Collier 2007. described the phenomenon as the "golden straitjacket" of globalization: "your economy grows and your politics shrinks." 10 But despite the economic logic of globalization and the tightening embrace of a neoliberal policy paradigm, states have remained salient actors and even expanded the scope and range of their activities. this development has come in response to demands for compensatory social protection and to the need to support and promote market development and increasingly to regulate social and market based risks.
11 scholars such as Paul Pierson, geoffrey garrett, Cathie Jo martin, duane swank, and others have shown how political and ideological structures as well as economic forces shape national public policies, particularly welfare state policies and the tax regimes that underlie welfare capacities.
12 this theme is not entirely new, however, since comparativists such as david Cameron and Peter Katzenstein addressed the effects of economic openness and interdependence on national policy regimes thirty years ago.
13 the state is also a crucial player in a more recently influential model of comparative political economy, the Hall and soskice "varieties of capitalism" framework. the model is premised on a dichotomy between coordinated and uncoordinated market economies, although, as Jonah levy has pointed out, the state's role in the varieties of capitalism framework is more passive than active. 14 the domestic rise of the american state turning more directly to the unlikely case of the united states, it is clear that even in its inhospitable institutional environment-the horizontal separation of powers and the vertical federal system-the centralized expression of institutional power and political authority has been of immense and growing importance in the last decade. Whether in domestic policy measures such as the centralizing no Child left Behind education measure or in the post-9/11 "war on terror"-the invasion of afghanistan and the war in Iraq, the Patriot act, the national security agency's domestic surveillance program, the detention and treatment of "enemy combatants" both at home and abroad-or in response to national catastrophes such as Hurricane Katrina's devastation of new orleans, myriad political events have provoked a centralized expres-10 friedman , 87. 11 Hall 1993 Blyth 2002; Weiss 2003; levy 2006a . 12 garrett 1998 rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pierson 2001; swank 2002; martin 2004; Iversen 2005; Berman 2006 . 13 Katzenstein 1978; Cameron 1978. 14 Hall and soskice 2001; levy 2006b. sion of political authority in a way consistent with state power. Indeed, delivering his post-Katrina speech from new orleans in september 2005, President george W. Bush declared that the crisis demanded "greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces" in american society. 15 more stealthily, the federal government's expansive legislation against criminal activity and perpetrators has markedly extended the intrusive and coercive apparatus of the american state.
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In effect and despite his previous credentials as a small-government, anti-federal activism republican, Bush underlined a commonplace of american life entrenched since the 1930s: during national crises citizens look to the political center as the authority to alleviate suffering and ameliorate unequal conditions of membership. In contrast to his recent predecessors-think of Carter's commitment to deregulation, reagan's reduction of domestic spending (though not defense), or even Clinton's declaration that "the era of big government is over" and his reform of federal welfare policy-the Bush administration selfconsciously pursued institutional expansion and rendered the american national state more assertive and visible, both at home and abroad, than at any time since the 1960s. 17 not only is it more forceful, but the american state is also more contested and controversial than it has been in a generation or more. there is increasingly fundamental disagreement among americans, at least among political parties and elites, about the role, size, and national capacity of the state-the basic liberal-conservative continuum that captures the range of beliefs about state intervention in the economy and society. as nolan mcCarty and colleagues have shown, ideological polarization along this dimension has increased dramatically since the 1960s and is significantly correlated with the increase in income inequality that has occurred over the same period. 18 Curiously, however, the poles are, in some respects, reversed with regard to the role of the state. In the immediate postwar era the conservative position on the ideological spectrum was resolutely opposed to state intervention in the economy and society. Barry goldwater's nomination for president in 1964 neatly sums up this position. a western small-government conservative, goldwater was the mouthpiece for a burgeoning movement of antigovernment republican activists who 15 resisted their party's accommodationism toward the still-dominant new deal. 19 this ideological movement reached its crest with the election of ronald reagan as president in 1980. But in the wake of the Vietnam War, the conservative, nominally antistatist position came increasingly to be associated with a more assertive role for the united states in international politics and a more confrontational cold war stance with the soviet union. that assertive and increasingly unilateral internationalism, along with the george W. Bush administration's arrogation of executive power, has put liberals in the position of opposing the expansion of some aspects of state power even as they continue to promote increased state activity in domestic areas such as health care.
these intellectual and empirical trends are important grounds for a renewed interest in the american state. It is a significant actor in american domestic politics and thereby a source of division among americans.
20 this role stems in part from the mobilization of the federal government as an agent of democratization in the united states under the civil rights and voting legislation enacted in the 1960s (which Barry goldwater and other conservative republicans opposed not because they opposed integration but because they feared that these acts granted excessive power to the federal government and risked creating a police state).
21 not only did these laws advance democratic institutionalization in the united states but they also generated their own antitheses, especially in respect to american stances toward both race and the state.
22 to this pattern we can add an ambitious domestic policy program involving major centralized initiatives. furthermore, an administration that entered office indifferent to international politicsincluding reaching multilateral agreements or supporting humanitarian interventions-did little after the terrorist attacks of september 2001 except engage internationally, though often unilaterally and in opposition to traditional allies' preferences.
Yet scholars have mostly failed to grasp this analytical opportunity to understand the american state as a "state," opting instead, by and large, to repeat rather than to critically engage the assumption that the american case is too exceptional to warrant comparative attention. by this Janus-faced, complex institution. 24 given these dual patternsboth the state's general survival in the face of globalization and interdependence and the american state's particular development-it is time, we suggest, to reconsider the prevailing Weberian view of the state and revive or at least revisit the more multidimensional understanding of the state suggested by nettl's contribution. We need, in particular, to find a framework that can help us to better understand the sources and workings of the american state's curious yet enduring power.
the new comparative politics of the state fortunately, recent years have seen sterling investigations of the state in comparative and international politics that have grappled directly with these new puzzles. these studies have emerged out of the postcold war era, in which many of the assumptions about globalization and its impact on the state have been defied and in which there have arisen, particularly in the postcommunist shadow of the former soviet union, new states that followed a different path toward democracy and state building than their european predecessors of an earlier century. these works, a few of which we examine here, expand the view of state building to include the role of actors that are conventionally considered to be outside the "state" proper in the evolution of the functions of governance -financing, regulating, maintaining order, and the like. the works we consider here take a variety of approaches and apply a variety of methods to the new politics of the state. some are explicitly comparative, drawing inferences from two or more states; others focus more sharply on the united states. they span a range of quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis and cover a wide range of time periods, from the mid-nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. and their views of the state reflect somewhat different perspectives. Ziblatt and Johnson are perhaps closest to the classic concerns of the state literature, focusing on the development of the extractive and regulatory capacity of major states. grzymała-Busse, too, approaches the state as a set of formal structures, although she focuses mostly on mechanisms of oversight and control that guard against predatory behavior among groups. Hacker is concerned with the welfare state, another facet of the state's capacity to regulate society by managing the risks associated with industrial capitalism and the spread of wage labor.
Cumulatively, however, they constitute a rejection of older models of the state and suggest directions for further inquiry and understanding of the puzzles and ironies of the state's resilience in the face of apparent powerlessness and decline. these contributions imply a useful modification to a view of the state that privileges the Weberian-style development of centralized, coercive administrative authority, and collectively they suggest the utility of a multidimensional conceptual approach that locates "stateness" in a variety of places, some unexpected. But they also suggest that such a framework can usefully be modified to accommodate new patterns of state-society interconnections and associational patterns.
federalism and infrastructural power
In his important book, daniel Ziblatt challenges most directly the conventional approach to the state and its capacity, taking on the common presumption that federalism is the consequence of an incomplete state-building process that effectively dissipates authority and inhibits the further development of centralized state capacity. Ziblatt distinguishes between two ways in which federal systems emerge, depending on the level of infrastructural capacity possessed by units at the subnational level. "Infrastructural power" refers to the state's capacity to penetrate society and implement decisions through the coordinated activity of civil-society actors, as distinguished from "despotic power," which describes the state's ability to coerce compliance. 25 to explain the divergence of federal or unitary outcomes, conventional accounts of federalism emphasize the relative coercive or despotic power of the central government and subnational units. In these accounts it is the relative coercive power-especially military power-between the center and the subunits that determines whether the center is able to create a unitary state through conquest or is forced to make concessions to relatively strong subnational units that are able to resist conquest. In such accounts federalism represents an incomplete form of state building, in which the center fails to consolidate control over its territory and cedes sovereignty to lower units through some kind of "federal bargain."
26 this approach provides the essential logic behind the standard account of federalism as a basic constraint on the american state.
Ziblatt, by contrast, argues that it is the infrastructural power of subnational units, not the coercive power of the center, that particularly shapes federal bargains and determines whether state-building outcomes are federal or unitary. regional units with substantial infrastructural power-defined as "high levels of (1) state rationalization, (2) state institutionalization, and (3) embeddedness of the state in society"-offer to would-be state builders from the center the capacity to penetrate society immediately and without the cost and fuss of imposing such capacity from above. subunits that can already do the things states do-regulate society and the economy, extract revenue, and maintain order-are more likely to conclude successful federal bargains than subunits that lack these capacities. When such infrastructural power is lacking at lower levels, unitary state building by conquest becomes more likely.
Ziblatt applies this framework effectively to the puzzling cases of germany and Italy in the late nineteenth century. In germany, powerful Prussia seemed primed to achieve national unification by coercion, while in Italy Piedmont had less coercive military power than the other regions of Italy. and yet german unification took the form of a federal state, in which regional states retained a fair amount of power, while the Italian risorgimento ultimately, after many fits and starts, took the form of a military conquest of the entire peninsula to bring it under common rule. using innovative measures and data sources to observe the infrastructural characteristics of regional governments prior to unification, Ziblatt shows that these outcomes followed from the relative infrastructural capacity of regional governments in the two cases-higher in germany relative to Prussia than in Italy relative to Piedmont. thus he builds a sequenced model of federal state development in which preexisting subnational institutions are causal; federalism is "an outgrowth of a very specific path of nation-state formation in which state building and political development precede national unification, leaving in place a set of states that can both negotiate the terms of national unification and effectively govern after national unification" (p. 16).
Ziblatt's framework emphasizes the origins of national states and particular federalist or unitary institutional arrangements at the expense of analyzing the potentially distinct processes that either sustain federalist arrangements or promote state building or political development-"a durable shift in governing authority," as orren and skowronek define it-more generally.
27 this focus, while providing powerful leverage over the question of state formation and institutional design, has perhaps somewhat less to offer to an understanding of the forces that nurture (or undermine) those arrangements over time. Contemporary germany and Italy, to take Ziblatt's own cases, are more similar today than his analysis might imply, and both passed through episodes of extreme state centralization-fascism-in the last century. to what extent are these developmental paths immanent in state origins? do institutional origins establish conditions that make certain kinds of subsequent change and state growth more or less likely by privileging certain kinds of interest organization, group-state relations, ideological or cultural patterns, or policy outcomes that might affect state development down the path? attention to the united states magnifies these questions. on the one hand, the united states-a case of negotiated federalism in a context of high levels of infrastructural power in subnational units-seems to confirm Ziblatt's argument. But this approach to american federalism and its state-building implications sidesteps the crucial variable in the american case: race. although the capacity of the original states may indeed have facilitated american state building, as Ziblatt's framework suggests, one of the principal effects of american federalist arrangements (and probably a principal cause as well) was to reserve to the states the power to regulate and to police race relations and, hence, to subordinate african americans. over the course of american history, race has both inhibited national state growth through federalism and enhanced state building, through the development of repressive capacity and the more positive deployment of force to protect rights and promote democratization.
28 this dual nature of the race-state connection deepens the origins development that Ziblatt's framework poses.
nevertheless, Ziblatt's lucid analysis of these two particular historical cases implies a broader conclusion, that state structures are built not simply through the creation de novo of centralized coercive capacity but often through negotiated links with decentralized power centers, even in the case of the vaunted Prussian and german states of the nineteenth century, which come as close to the Weberian ideal type as one can imagine. the implication for the united states is clear: looking for "stateness" in terms of centralized bureaucracies or other formal institutions of coercion risks missing the key elements of american state building. american state building came about not to the exclusion of other social and political structures but in conjunction with a set of partners both in the polity and in civil society. political parties and state building In Ziblatt's analysis, the key partners in the state-building process were themselves states, governments whose bureaucratic capacity (or lack thereof ) shaped and constrained the possibilities open to would-be centralizers. But these partners need not be states or even governmental institutions. as anna grzymała-Busse shows in Rebuilding Leviathan, political parties can also play a parallel role in the development and deployment of state authority. the conventional Weberian-inflected model regards the state as an autonomous sector, differentiated from and independent of society and engaged in a more or less zerosum struggle with other organizations over power and resources. thus, strong opposition to a national regime or robust civil society sectors are often seen as posing a threat to strong and effective states and thriving at the expense of state autonomy, capacity, and power. this view of a trade-off between civil society and the state is consistent not only with the neo-tocquevillian view of american society but with other analyses of the potential perils of strong civil-society attachments that can form bases for the eclipse or takeover of the state.
29 one implication of this approach is that state building and consolidation occur more readily in situations where opposition is constrained and where coalitions for the centralization and rationalization of governing authority are more readily formed and sustained. this proposition, which applies most directly to Western europe in the modern period, also seems to account for the conventionally understood peculiarities of state development in the united states, where political contestation was routinized before the bureaucratization of governance.
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Rebuilding Leviathan, in effect and ingeniously, turns this proposition on its head. In an imaginative comparison across former soviet bloc countries in eastern europe, grzymała-Busse shows that strong opposition, in the form of robust party competition, was conducive to state building. after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the soviet empire, many countries in eastern and Central europe (former Warsaw Pact countries and breakaway soviet republics alike) sought to recast their states as democracies, instituting meaningful elections, parliaments, and, consequently, political parties that sought to win power and capture the resources that come from controlling the state. In some of these countries-notably the Czech republic and slovakia but also Bulgaria and latvia-governing parties were able to consolidate their 29 Berman 1997; Berman, 2003 Berman, . 30 shefter 1977 control of the state and its resources and build up the size and, ultimately, the coercive power of the state. In other countries-especially Hungary but also Poland, estonia, slovenia, and lithuania-incumbent parties were more constrained by robust partisan opposition and more closely fought competition for election victories and state control. these conditions of greater contestation and uncertainty about control of the state produced greater constraints on incumbents' capacity to exploit the state and, consequently, on the development of the state's own coercive capacity.
the irony of grzymała-Busse's story is that it was in the latter group of countries, where state building was apparently more constrained by opposition and contestation, that the more robust and effective states (as measured by both the scope and the reach of state activities and the safeguards in place against patronage and clientelism) emerged. robust competition, in grzymała-Busse's picture, importantly goes beyond simply measuring the effective number of parties in a system to encompass as well a set of mechanisms by which the presence of opposition can lead to constraints on the ruling coalition's capacity to exploit the state for its and its members' own gain. these characteristics of robust party competition include the clarity of ideological or programmatic alternatives in the party system, the plausibility of out-parties coming into government in the future, and the tendency for opposition legislators to be vocal in their criticism of the government's behavior (and of the government to tolerate such criticism). When these characteristics are present, she demonstrates, ruling parties face greater electoral uncertainty and consequently construct institutions that constrain their own rent-seeking behavior in the short run so that the behavior of their competitors will be equally constrained after a future transfer of power. It is in these cases-where rulers are more constrained in their capacity to capture and exploit the apparatus of governance-that strong and effective states emerge and develop governing capacity and political legitimacy. this she shows powerfully and effectively.
like Ziblatt's analysis, however, grzymała-Busse's argument poses something of a conundrum for the literature on the state. Her analysis very effectively focuses on the means of building the state's formal administrative structures that can exert control over the allocation of resources, particularly as an alternative to clientelistic arrangements that allow for the exploitation of state resources by particularistic groups. Paralleling skowronek's pioneering analysis of the american nineteenth-century "state of courts and parties," she expands the analytical ambit of the state by showing how apparently nonstate actors such as political parties can contribute to the construction and operation of successful states. at the same time, however, the opposition between patronage and state building has the effect of reifying the administrative dimension of stateness perhaps more than necessary. as skowronek shows, highly organized patronage-based parties are not altogether incompatible with state building; more recent work on the united states has shown that despite its fundamental basis in patronage networks that seem incompatible with strong state development, the early american state was a formidable presence in american society.
31 the functional emphasis on centralized authority also tends to exclude the possibilities for the development of state capacity through means other than centralized administration-decentralization, as Ziblatt shows, or its mingling of seemingly public and private realms, as in michael Katz's account of the mixed economy of the early american welfare state.
32 this approach, moreover, provides less purchase on the distinctive regulatory character of the american state's expansion in the twentieth century. and the notion that social pressures "generated strong domestic demands" cannot be uncritically applied to the american case given the deep resistance in major parts of american society (reflected in its constitutional design) to a strong center.
grzymała-Busse's argument does help to flesh out the logic connecting robert dahl's procedural model of democracy and its connections to american state building. dahl emphasizes political contestation as a critical element of democracy, which has especially characterized the united states (even as the participatory inclusiveness of the american regime-dahl's other key dimension of democracy-has fluctuated over time).
33 But the state has also been, at times, a critical guarantor of democratic rights, suggesting that democratic contestation and state power are not, as they might intuitively seem, incompatible.
34 grzymała-Busse shows that political contestation has been essential not only to constructing and sustaining democratic political arrangements but also to erecting effective states. Her argument offers a plausible framework for investigating the links between the apparent weaknesses and limitations of the american state and its surprising strength. this american state has emerged neither through the development of classic Weberian administrative capacity nor through a tocquevillian trade-off between state and civil society; rather, it emerged 31 skowronek 1982; novak 2008; Carpenter 2001; Polsky and adler 2008. 32 Katz, 1986 Katz, . 33 dahl 1971 Keyssar 2000; Valelly 2004 . 34 King and lieberman forthcoming.
by virtue of its ability to command legitimacy and mobilize capacity outside of the state's formal institutional boundaries, suggesting, as does Ziblatt's work, that american "stateness" is to be found in unconventional places.
the new politics of the american state even as comparative scholars have been rethinking the state's origins and boundaries, scholars of american political development have been examining the american state in parallel ways. these works similarly explore alternative pathways to state building and alternative definitions of the state in the american context, in which the state is often occluded and its capacity to regulate and penetrate society is ill understood. like Ziblatt and grzymała-Busse, Johnson and Hacker show how forces that are conventionally understood as barriers to state power in the united states-federalism and the primacy of private associational and corporate power-have been mobilized to enhance the state's power and scope, providing a fresh perspective on the puzzle of the exercise of national authority in the united states. strength in weakness: american federalism among recent works in american political development, Kimberley Johnson's Governing the American State has most fully, if not self-consciously, internalized some of the lessons about alternative conceptions of stateness that parallel the new comparative politics of the state. Johnson's central question is precisely on point: how did gilded age and Progressive era reformers who sought a more interventionist government respond to, and in many cases evade, the constraints imposed by the structure of the nineteenth-century american state? these reformers, whom Johnson terms "national state builders," aimed to expand the reach of american national governance to encompass new mechanisms of control over areas of society and the economy previously unregulated by the national government. for many, Johnson writes, "the goal . . . was Hamiltonian in its scope-a truly national government with significant powers and resources to address what reformers saw as the moral and political ills of the day": in short, a state approximating the Weberian model that could exercise centralized authority over american society. these reformers, however, were repeatedly stymied by the american political system, "an assemblage of weak legislative institutions dominated by a multitude of powerful interests, and characterized by limited administrative capacity" (p. 2). sharing skowronek's emphasis on re-formers' attempts to reconstruct the nineteenth-century "state of courts and parties," Johnson's question focuses attention on the immanent characteristics of american "stateness" that these reformers engaged in their drive to expand the scope of american national governance. 35 the american regime, Johnson points out, was not without ample coercive opportunities and resources. this authority, however, rested not with the federal government but with state and local government, where, as William novak has shown, governments exerted expansive authority over realms of life from matters of public works, safety and sanitation, and commerce to matters of morality and individual behavior that would today be considered beyond the reach of any public authority. 36 In this context, federalism became not simply a barrier to the development of state capacity, as it is usually portrayed, but a tool in the hands of reformers-in the form of "intergovernmental policy instruments," arrangements whereby policy authority was shared between federal and state governments. examples of such arrangements include the now-commonplace practices of federal grants to subsidize (and, consequently, direct) state and local policy or federal rules that explicitly limit or supersede state policy (pp. 45-48). through a careful study of intergovernmental policy-making in three policy areas-food and drug regulation, transportation, and maternal and child welfarebetween the end of reconstruction and the onset of the great depression, Johnson shows that these intergovernmental policy instruments formed an increasingly important part of the american governmental apparatus. they emerged, she argues, precisely out of the tension between the modernizing impulses of reformers and the fragmentary parochialism of the early american state. shaped by the partisan and electoral motives of primarily locally oriented members of Congress, these policy instruments nevertheless expanded the reach and cohesion of the american state, bringing it to the brink of the new deal and forming the platform on which the new deal itself was built.
a classical Weberian reading of Johnson's narrative might question two aspects of her argument. first, why should these tortuously developed intergovernmental policy instruments be understood as proxies for real centralized bureaucratic power? "Intergovernmental policy," she writes, "became the instrument of american state development," and she interprets the development of these policy-making structures as fairly unambiguous evidence of emerging state capacity-the means by which elected officials and other legitimately constituted holders of power could achieve concrete governance ends. But a skeptic might wish to draw the opposite inference about the american state to that proffered by Johnson: these convoluted instruments develop precisely because the american state is weak. In her depiction of the rube goldberg state in the same era, elisabeth Clemens suggests that by blurring the boundaries between public and private, these arrangements contributed to the erosion of legitimacy of state action in later periods. 37 a further question that bears more directly on the status of these intergovernmental instruments as true state-building episodes is their ultimate effectiveness at achieving deliberate policy outcomes as a measure of stateness. Johnson provides some evidence on this scoremeasures of highway spending (chap. 5) and maternal and child health grants to the states (chap. 6)-to show these effects but in general Johnson raises this question more effectively than she answers it. moreover, the emerging intergovernmental structure of the american state served largely to accommodate and buttress prevailing racial arrangements, provoking local resistance where it appeared to have the potential to disrupt prevailing racial orders, a theme we take up below. In general, Johnson's work exposes a central conundrum of research on the state: if a state structure exists but does not affect the exercise of power and the allocation of burdens and benefits, what does it mean to call it a "state structure"? does stateness inhere in the formal organizational structures of governance or in the visible consequences of those structures? the dates that bracket Johnson's study are telling: 1877, the end of reconstruction, and 1929, the beginning of the cascade of economic and political events that led to franklin roosevelt's first hundred days and his subsequent reconstruction of the american state.
38 this is an era often understood as a fallow period in the development of the american state, when national reformers were routinely blocked until the "big bang" of the new deal. to be sure, much work on the early american welfare and regulatory states has seen the Progressive era as a critical precursor of later developments and has emphasized more gradual developments both before and after the new deal.
39
But Johnson shows decisively that the apparent leap from state and local to national policy-making and administration was less abrupt than conventional accounts of american political development suggest; rather, the new deal was built on a foundation of careful and creative, 37 Clemens 2006 37 Clemens . 38 milkis 1993 37 Clemens . 39 skocpol 1992 Ward 2005; Howard 2007; skowronek 1982. if quiet and unconventional, state building in the preceding decades. like the other cases detailed in the works under discussion, Johnson's state-building story relies on a notion of stateness that departs from Weberian convention, rooted in bottom-up means, associational linkages, and center-periphery partnerships. on the eve of the new deal the american state did not look like a state but it could increasingly behave like one, largely through the accretion of developments that Johnson chronicles. What came after-from the gendered and racially compromised enactments of the new deal, to the hybrid public-private accretion of welfare state policy, to the triangular struggles among federal and local authorities and community groups in the great society, to the devolution struggles of the late twentieth century-followed in large measure from the patterns that Johnson observes. 40 the hybrid welfare state It is just this peculiar path of social policy development that Jacob Hacker charts in his important work on the american welfare state. Hacker challenges the conventional approach to the state from a different angle, however, emphasizing the private sector's systematic role in the american system of social provision. He opens his argument by puncturing the commonplace myth of the small american welfare state. although the united states lags considerably behind almost all other industrialized countries in its level of direct public spending on social benefits-the conventional measure of the welfare state's size, reach, and protective capacity-he shows that when the value of "publicly regulated and subsidized private benefits" is included, the american welfare state suddenly looks much more generous, approaching even the level of scandinavian welfare systems (pp. 13-20) . this public-private hybrid extends especially to some of the welfare state's core functions: retirement pensions and health insurance. In most industrial countries, most citizens receive pensions, health care, and many other social benefits through programs directly established and administered by the government and financed by taxes. In the united states, however, these primary welfare state functions are divided between public programs (social security, medicare, medicaid) and apparently private benefits, generally provided by employers to their employees (group health insurance, corporate pensions, so-called 401(k) retirement investment schemes, individual retirement accounts, and the like). But as Hacker shows (building on earlier work by Beth stevens, Christopher Howard, and others), such benefits are not entirely private; they are regulated by the government (through laws such as the employee retirement Income security act) and effectively subsidized through the favorable tax treatment of both contributions and benefits. 41 Hacker's detailed analysis of the historical evolution of this hybrid public-private welfare state accomplishes a number of things. first, it reframes common presumptions about the exceptionalism of the american state. not only does he show that the american welfare state is more extensive than is generally understood, but he also challenges conventional notions of how to understand and define what the welfare state is. What makes the american welfare state distinctive, he suggests, is not that it is a "weakling" and a "laggard," as an older generation of welfare state studies tended to argue because the united states was a late and partial adopter of national social insurance, nor that it was, as theda skocpol later argued, an early adopter of particular kinds of public social provision, notably veterans' pensions and maternalist policies.
42 rather, the american welfare state's peculiarities stem from its mobilization of seemingly private actors to participate in functions that are usually considered public. Hacker, in fact, goes even further than grzymała-Busse in incorporating nongovernmental actors into a conception of the state; Hacker's key "private" actors are not office-and spoils-seeking political parties but instead are employers, health insurance companies, investment firms, and labor unions.
Hacker's careful historical analysis shows that this hybrid form, in which functions and actors usually separately ascribed to the separate spheres of "state" and "market" overlap and intermingle, arose in the united states largely due exactly to the classically "weak" structures of the american state that have constrained the adoption of comprehensive social benefits and to which most analysts of the american welfare system ascribe the american welfare state's weakness and limitation.
Hacker's important approach to the american welfare state accomplishes a number of things. first, it offers an example of how creative comparative analysis of the state can inform the study of american political development. By subtly altering the standard comparative frame of american welfare state studies, Hacker zeroes in on the key distinguishing feature of the american state. He does not pursue the comparative insight as far as he might-beyond the comparative data presented in the introduction, the book contains very little discussion 41 stevens 1988; Howard 1997 Howard . 42 skocpol 1992 of cases beyond the united states-so the inferences that can be drawn from his analysis about the causal pathways that produced the american hybrid must remain tentative. second, it uses the american case to expose the limits of conventional bureaucratic approaches to the state. By revealing the public-private features of the american welfare state, Hacker directly challenges dominant models of the welfare state that focus exclusively on governmental sources of social protection. In later work, Hacker analyzes the consequences of this hybrid welfare state for the distribution of risk in a system where protection against social risks is spread across the public and private sectors, showing the perils of privatized risk especially for the most vulnerable, lower-income americans.
43 But these implications merely underscore the importance of Hacker's approach to the state by displaying the distributional consequences of different state forms, a direction in welfare state studies that is proving remarkably fruitful for other researchers. 44 at the same time, Hacker's analysis of the porous boundary between public and private in the mechanisms of american social provision reveals another important conundrum: where are the boundaries of the state properly located? the thrust of the new comparative politics of the state is that the conventional rendering of the state in bureaucratic terms is too narrow to capture the mechanisms of power that operate in the process of governance. 45 But if we load too much on to the definition of the state-not just formal governing institutions but also intermediary structures such as political parties and apparently private actors such as citizens and businesses-then we risk rendering the state useless as an analytical concept. Hacker recognizes this danger and tries to finesse it by avoiding the term "welfare state" and borrowing the terminology of "welfare regimes" from gøsta esping-andersen (while also challenging esping-andersen's regime typology) (pp. 10-12, 342-43) . 46 While this move serves Hacker's own purposes, allowing him to zero in on the causes and characteristics of the distinctive american hybrid welfare system, it merely defers analytical and empirical consideration of the larger question about the state's boundaries. If state and society are as entangled as Hacker suggests, then the conventional distinction is untenable and some new formulation becomes necessary. 43 47 the mechanisms behind these patterns of development commonly differ from the conventional routes to state building, which tend to follow principally from the imperatives of modernization and war, mediated by the administrative legacies of varieties of absolutism. In these alternative cases, however, state building followed alternative pathways in which it was enabled by the simultaneous development of restraints on state power that accompanied the expansion of state capacity in order to prevent predation against citizens by dominant groups through control of the state.
48
In the 1970s and 1980s scholars of what would crystallize into the field of american political development began to consider the peculiarities of the american state against the earlier conventional backdrop. reacting to early accounts of the american state as a peculiarity in comparative terms-an underdeveloped "tudor state" that lacked the coercive capacity to maintain order in a rapidly modernizing society, as samuel Huntington argued in the 1960s-the foundational work of stephen skowronek showed that the united states was not as stateless as Huntington contended. 49 rather, he suggested that american national administrative capacities developed out of america's distinctive political patterns rather than out of the european model of the progressive democratization of absolutism. 50 Building on skowronek's insights, legions of studies since have examined the development, peculiarities, and capacities of the american state, placing it at the center of the subfield of american political development.
51 nevertheless, the imagery of weakness in the study of the american state persisted and the european-derived Weberian ideal type-defined by the existence 47 In addition to the works reviewed here, see obinger, leibfried, and Castles 2005; and leibfried and Zürn 2005. 48 north and Weingast 1989; Weingast 1997 . 49 Huntington 1968, chap. 2; skowronek 1982 . 50 moore 1966 mann 1993; shefter 1977 shefter . 51 Carpenter 2003 orren and skowronek 2004. of formal, coercive administrative power lodged with public bureaucracies-remained the standard against which the american state was measured, along dimensions such as presence, size, strength, autonomy, and the like. In this perspective, the american state is regarded as weak, bloodless, and limited in scale and scope. this conventional framework derives from a number of characteristics of the american state comparatively and historically, characteristics that are usually cited cumulatively as evidence of american statelessness. But if we break down these aspects of the american state and examine each closely, we see that such a simplistic weak-strong metric fails to capture the complexities of the american state-just as Ziblatt and Johnson show variety in forms of federalism and grzymała-Busse and Hacker expose significant roles for nonstate actors in engineering administrative growth in nominally strong state polities. the cumulative effect of looking at the american state in this way is not to observe the weakness of the state but rather to expose those ironies and complexities of the american state that demand explanation. We briefly examine five aspects of the american state and suggest how the new comparative literature can help push american scholarship in a constructive direction: (1) the administrative state; (2) the standardizing state; (3) the fragmented state; (4) the associational state; and (5) the segregated state. each of these dimensions of american statenessand particularly the last-highlights limitations of the conventional approach as well as the possibilities offered by the more nuanced and multidimensional comparative approach. the administrative state: capacity without bureaucracy one reason for the absence of the term "state" in respect to the united states is the search for a common bureaucratic form, which has proved misguided and misleading. the quintessential bureaucratic state, made famous by the german sociologist max Weber, was the contemporary Prussian and french form. In contrast to the professional elite bureaucrats who presided over centralized power in these countries, american national bureaucracy is notoriously fragile, fragmented, and incapacitated by its ambiguous position in the governmental structure. american national bureaucracy does not wield the sort of authoritative coercive power considered to be enjoyed by its european counterparts; there is no cadre of professional elite bureaucrats comparable to the senior civil servants who preside over centralized power in europe. furthermore, american civil servants do not move among agencies during their career, and consequently individual agencies in the american na-tional government are more autonomous and must rely on their own networks and entrepreneurship for influence. 52 together with the rule of law, however, these bureaucracies proved to be preconditions for democratization in the united states. the american state has at times been able to act as a guarantor of democratic rights alongside its role as a maintainer of internal order and external integrity, protecting and extending at least the procedural elements of democracy that robert dahl long ago identified as essential-a polity with free and open elections, low barriers to participation, genuine political competition, and the protection of civil liberties. these conditions, then, have possibly proved to be necessary for the extension of the american state's authority, much as grzymała-Busse has suggested for eastern europe, by at least minimally ensuring the legitimacy of democratic outcomes. thus, a dahlian procedural conception of democracy illustrates an alternative to the Weberian approach to stateness, connected precisely to its democratic openness. 53 the works under review suggest both the limitations of a bureaucratic view and the plausibility of a more expansive view of the state in american political development. Ziblatt and Johnson, for instance, reveal mechanisms of state building based not exclusively on the direct building of central administrative capacity. rather, these works highlight cases of state building that occurred through the negotiated colonization of capacity that originated outside the central state, even in the case of german unification, which remains the classic model of the bureaucratic state. In the german case, this development fed the creation of the Weberian state and buttressed the already formidable Prussian bureaucracy. But in the united states, as Johnson shows, this path enhanced the federal government's ability to achieve a range of policy objectives through federal-state partnerships that produced effective state capacity without bureaucracy. the differences between the european and american paths suggest again the importance of democracy as a precondition for the distinctive american pattern of state building. In continental europe states predated democracy, whose arrival was often triggered by war-induced collapse and external pressure. american experience differs from continental european trajectories in that a comprehensive democratic framework as a set of procedures was established before the expansion of national federal bureaucratic departments of the sort compelled upon politicians from the Civil War. However, inclusion within these procedures, despite a rhetorical com- 52 Carpenter 2001 52 Carpenter . 53 dahl 1971 King and lieberman 2009. mitment to the rule of law, was limited and defined many american citizens (and those ineligible for citizenship) as outside the democratic process. american state development was, as Johnson (and others) suggest, shaped by these distinctive democratic pressures, producing a state whose means of action depended on links with lower-level governments, private associations, and other actors. thus to equate the absence of a centralized bureaucratic Weberian structure with an absent state is false and no longer tenable analytically. What the united states possesses is a different kind of state.
54
the standardizing state Both because many central initiatives have been resisted and because the center's institutional capacity is weak comparatively, it is often maintained that the american state's capacity to establish and enforce uniform national standards for policy and governance is limited. 55 margaret Weir, for example, has documented just how durable preProgressive patterns of state-level governments were until long after the second World War despite the dramatic central interventions of the new deal. Weir concludes that "because the reform impulse that transformed the federal government in the 1930s had no enduring counterpart in the states," the persistence of state-level patterns of local politics and skewed policy was assured. 56 the resistance to national standards and the persistence of localism in policy-making represent the national state's limits in commanding uniformity in the design and application of policy and the enforcement of rights across the population. among the principal costs of the devolution of power to small local units and the resulting policy diversity has been the tendency to place policy-making in the hands of oppressive local majorities; the principal bearers of this cost, for most of american history, have been african americans. 57 thus this federal-state policy divergence, among other effects, helped to cement the segregationist racial order manifest not only in the ideology of states' rights and the locally rooted policies of Jim Crow but 54 It may well be that the european union's development as a state resembles the american case more than the experience of member states. the way the european Court of Justice operates, the way in which the european Commission formulates, issues and enforces regulatory policy, and the relative smallness of the central bureaucracy compared with member state bureaucracies all suggest parallels. the hesitant development of a common currency across the eu member states and the pinched character of eu foreign policy, however, exemplify the problems of state building at the eu level. see, for example, nicolaidis and Howse 2001. 55 Weir and skocpol 1985. 56 Weir 2005 56 Weir , 158. 57 riker 1964 also in patterns of urban residential segregation, local labor markets, and access to local government. It withstood the shock of World War II, although this engagement, along with the cold war that followed, did open later opportunities for change by mobilizing national political actors in the cause of civil rights.
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While differential treatment of disadvantaged groups, especially african americans, and lack of uniformity in national policy have long been hallmarks of the american national state's performance, standard setting by the national state has not been entirely unsuccessful. again, as Ziblatt and Johnson show, federalism need not be a barrier to the development of national policy uniformity, directed by a central state. moreover, grzymała-Busse suggests how democratic competitiveness might be associated with greater uniformity and standardization in national governance or at least with the relative absence of patronage and its attendant variability in relations between the state and electorally defined groups. these insights direct our attention to the mechanisms by which the american state has managed to achieve some measure of policy standardization despite its roots in a patronage-based party system and its perpetually fraught relations with racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, and other disfavored groups.
since the Progressive era-particularly during those bursts of political innovation and federal activism associated with the new deal, the second World War, and the great society and again under the administration of george W. Bush-it has been the national center of the polity that has been most active, guided by the notion of establishing universal standards in policy. such activism is manifest in federal initiatives in regulation, welfare policy, education policy, defense, enforcement activities such as antidrugs and prison programs, environmentalism, and, recently, homeland security. this drive has not been entirely centralizing, of course; the 1996 welfare reform, for example, restored some policy authority to states in an area that had been increasingly centralized since 1935, and recent supreme Court decisions have begun to reverse what had seemed like a nationalizing trend.
59 the central state's role in setting national policy standards, then, remains a contested area but it is the only authority capable of such activity.
although partisan in origin, federal programs nonetheless compose a recognizable expression of national authority and policies, in ways comparable to other countries. 60 tional core of political authority-lawmakers, presidents, and judgesproclaim ends and mobilize support for policy ideas; implementation, definition of detail, regulation of practices, policing of deviance from identified standards, and renewal of mandates depend critically upon bureaucrats, their allies, and public compliance.
61
Indeed, without the development of a central bureaucratic state to enforce standards of democratic procedure (such as the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments), the american democratization process would have remained incomplete. nor is standard setting at an end: aspects of american procedures for reaching democratic outcomes continue to create important inequities-such as the electoral College-and lines of exclusion-such as the denial of voting rights to ex-felons in many states.
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as much as other states, the american state engages continuously in policy formulation, regulation, standard setting, and enforcement. that this formulation and enforcement of uniform standards has occurred in distinct ways-for instance, by relying on judicial power or creative bureaucratic rule making-and are regularly subjects of contestation and contention are further reasons why the american state's institutional capacity can be examined comparatively. 63 the fragmented state: multiple sites of power aside from foreign policy the term "state" has frequently been considered problematic when applied to the united states because of its fragmented polity.
64 Consequently, few americanists (outside of the american political development specialization) consider the american state a recognizable unit of analysis. the horizontal separation of powers among the executive, legislature, and judiciary makes the identification of a national source of authority more complicated than in centralized states, a tendency strengthened by federalism, which, combined with early franchise for white men, enabled strong ethnic-based community politics to develop around local political parties, a concatenation celebrated in former House speaker tip o'neill's aphorism, "all politics is local." 65 a well-rehearsed motif in american political culture is that of being a strong nation with a weak state whose citizens prize decentralization and localism, that is, a political system less 61 rose 2005. 62 Keyssar 2000; manza and uggen 2006. 63 Pedriana and stryker 2004. 64 on foreign policy, see Krasner 1978 . even in this sphere, however, there can be divisions in policy. 65 Katznelson 1981. centralized, less interventionist, and less Weberian than that found in comparable advanced democracies, including some with strong federal systems such as australia or germany. as a consequence of confronting a fragmented polity, scholars of american politics typically opt to focus discretely on the institutions of separated power, the presidency, Congress, the courts, or the bureaucracy or regulatory activity or on election cycles. the new comparative politics of the state, however, suggests that fragmentation by itself need not be debilitating to state development. the classical model of the state emphasizes its unitary character and tends to presume that alternative sites of power arise at the expense of the centralized national state. But as these works show, this is not necessarily the case. the relationship between alternative sites of power and the state is not always zero-sum. federalism, for example, long held to be one of the critical causes of structural fragmentation in american politicsdissipating power to fifty state governments and thousands of counties, municipalities, and other subnational units-can also be a lever for advancing the reach and functionality of the national state, as Ziblatt and Johnson show. similarly, robustly competitive political parties-one of the cornerstones of skowronek's rendering of the nineteenth-century "state of courts and parties"-need not descend into the sort of clientelistic state-society relations that often hinder the development of unified state authority. finally, Hacker's account of the development of the american welfare system shows quite clearly how the behavior of ostensibly private actors-employers, labor unions, the insurance industry, and others-operating in often disconnected ways in far-flung venues has cumulated into an identifiable, if distinctive and contested, welfare state that serves broadly public purposes of social protection through a variety of means.
these considerations subvert the standard presumption that the fragmentation of the american polity has necessarily produced a weak state and signal that the american political development literature should rethink its rendering of the state. Indeed, not only has the american state as a whole taken on an ever-increasing role in policymaking and governance in the last century, but the state's core institutions have also significantly expanded their particular mechanisms of wielding power. the federal courts, for example, have been increasingly inclined to employ constitutional authority to protect civil and political rights (while leaving the other branches substantial leeway to pursue their own policies in other realms). thus in the late 1930s only 10 percent of the supreme Court's decisions concerned individual rights (other than property rights), whereas by the late 1960s two-thirds of the Court's decisions pertained to individual rights.
66 this transformation marked an especially important legal and political revolution in the state's constitutional role in american society, from protector of limited government to instrument for the protection of civil rights. similarly, the presidency has expanded its power through the use of executive orders as a powerful complement to often-elusive statutory instruments. like court decisions, executive orders were an important component of the american state's expansion into civil rights protection, and they were key elements of the development of federal affirmative action in the 1960s. 67 since 9/11, of course, the american state has found itself further involved in security at home and abroad, including imposing new immigration and visa restrictions, expanding resources to monitor aliens in the united states, developing security at airports and other points of entry, expanding dramatically the homeland security budget, and creating a new national intelligence office overseeing the roles of the cia and the fbi.
68 the Bush White House also seized on post-9/11 conditions to pursue further expansion of presidential powers, through its issuance of signing statements asserting the right to implement statutes selectively and its energetic promotion of the theory of the unitary executive, which would limit congressional oversight of the executive. 69 furthermore, there is now little political reluctance at the center to use these features of the american state to achieve partisan ends: the american state is a forum in which struggles over standards and public policy unfold as current education reforms illustrate, struggles that have lately been exacerbated by growing inequality and ideological polarization.
70 these indicators of the increasing yet unconventional stateness of the american state highlight anew the need to revisit the question of the american state's distinctive history and characteristics.
the associational state: a strong nation from tocqueville's america writings onward, many analysts have emphasized the strength of american political culture and the country's sense of nationhood, reinforced by an ideology of liberal individualism, a decentralized institutional framework, and the rhetoric of inclusion to newcomers. such a view complements the analytical bias already 66 epp 1998; Keck 2004 Keck . 67 mayer 2001 Howell 2003; graham 1990 . 68 Kettl 2004 . 69 Yoo 2005 . 70 Bartels 2008. created by the multiple sites of power. american political culture remains imbued with tocquevillian assumptions about the superiority of decentralized policy and the dangers of excessive national regulation. these tocquevillian assumptions underlie an important tradition that sees civil society as a counterbalance to the centralization of state power and a necessary ingredient for the success of democratic governance.
71
But these assumptions have not limited an expansion in national state power and remit, and here Hacker outlines a comprehensive and convincing framework for considering the role of actors conventionally understood to belong to the private sector in constituting the welfare state. the evolution of this idea of what historian michael Katz has called the "mixed economy of the welfare state" has, in fact, been one of the signal achievements of welfare state scholarship in recent decades, culminating in Hacker's lucid and sophisticated account of the porous boundary between public and private social benefits in the united states.
72 such a perspective on the state, which deemphasizes the public-private distinction and instead emphasizes the state as part of an associational network, can be found elsewhere in recent studies of american politics: sean farhang and Paul frymer on law, for example, or daniel Carpenter on bureaucracy. 73 this approach to the american state has potentially broader application. for instance, education policy has been a quintessential local policy in the united states, and localism in education is generally defended in tocquevillian terms, emphasizing the role of local communities in education. Yet the recent "no Child left Behind" law gives the federal center exceptional involvement in local education, setting national standards in more or less direct defiance of the tocquevillian tradition. the american state has also played a major role in sustaining the values of american nationhood through a variety of policies and their enforcement: for instance, the phrase "under god" was added to the Pledge of allegiance in 1954 as an intentional buttressing of nationalist sentiment. 74 the tocquevillian version of american political culture has taken quite a scholarly hammering in the last few decades. Political scientist rogers m. smith demonstrates the presence of multiple traditions in american political culture rather than the exclusive creed of egalitarian 71 Putnam 1993 . 72 Katz 1995 liberalism emanating from tocqueville that found its most influential expression in the work of louis Hartz.
75 the degree to which many groups of american citizens were excluded from membership and had to engage in a persistent struggle for inclusion is now part of the national narrative.
76 recent work on the role of civil society organization in governance suggests that a robust civil society is not a substitute for a weak state and that civil society can best support democracy when it is closely aligned with strong political institutions and a functioning state.
77 finally, there is growing appreciation of the importance of the american state in fostering, sustaining, and renewing the values perceived as intrinsic to american political culture. national state institutions play a major integrative role in the united states, providing central foci around a common vision of the nation that the country's many ethnic, racial and national groups are invited to share and support (and that most do).
the most fundamental limitation of the tocquevillian celebration of decentralization and local communities is to neglect how localism permitted enduring discrimination and racism in the twentieth century. In practice, localism has meant discrimination and inequality.
78 as we know from many comparative studies of federalism, excessive local powers can become an enemy of civil liberties.
79 this certainly occurred in the united states, where states chose either to implement constitutional safeguards and legislative mandates for segregation in the 1880s and 1890s (in place until the 1960s) or to permit de facto segregated race relations, as in housing and schooling.
80 How federal policy did or did not complement these tendencies has been unduly overlooked.
the segregated state no theme better highlights the fruitfulness of this emerging approach to the state and the puzzles and dilemmas inherent in studying the american state than its relationship to race. the american state's deep and complex entanglement with patterns of racial classification, division, and hierarchy makes squeezing it into conventional comparative understandings of the state especially difficult.
81 the historic racially constructed differences among the population have been central to the 75 82 moreover, the state's orientation toward racial minorities, african americans in particular, has changed dramatically over the course of american history. the color line has undergirded some of the most notorious instances of state repression in american history-not only slavery and Jim Crow but also race-based immigration and citizenship restrictions, the internment of Japanese-americans during World War II, and the fbi's cointelpro operations of the cold war era, to name a few. at the same time, race is most commonly associated with state weakness through its effects on such processes as regional differentiation, class formation, and welfare state building; that is, these processes were fundamentally shaped by racial priorities. more recently, the state has been an agent of civil rights advancement, going from oppressor to protector in the span of a generation. these divergent outcomes highlight the profound puzzle that race poses for a coherent understanding of the american state.
Between the 1880s and passage of the civil rights legislation in the 1960s, the federal government in a range of areas colluded in the maintenance of segregated race relations, supported by the Court's condoning of segregation between 1896 and 1954. federal authority was employed either to impose or to accommodate segregated race relations in government departments and public policies.
83 this included how the united states Civil service Commission used, from 1914, photographs in appointment decisions in a way that discriminated against african americans. the general post-reconstruction spread of segregation, legitimated by the supreme Court, thus structured the american state's institutions, notably in the federal civil service; obviously, too, black representation in other national institutions was modest. Within the federal bureaucracy physical working conditions and daily routines were constructed around the segregation of one group of employees because of their race, and furthermore, advancement and promotion for bureaucrats was delimited by race. one group of employees, african americans, was placed in a subordinate position to whites, both formally and informally, as a consequence of their race. Before the 1960s african americans in the federal government rarely achieved positions in the professional or senior administrative classes 82 King and smith 2005. 83 King 2007b; Weiss 1969; Patler 2004. and were disproportionately confined to clerical, janitorial, or custodial positions. these arrangements dented the potential for equality of treatment by race in the federal government. throughout the united states african american citizens could not look to the national government to act impartially on their behalf, but instead watched it reproducing and on occasion promoting society's racist interests.
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Paradoxically many leading works of scholarship on core institutions of the american state overlook how race and segregation shaped their structure, content, and policy effects, as King and smith in particular have underlined.
85 this deficiency is one reason for singling out the segregationist dimension of the american state. the enduring significance of this segregated state has been documented most recently in Ira Katznelson's analysis of how a system of "affirmative action for whites" functioned concurrently with the expansion of the american state's organizations, administrative capacities, and public programs from the 1930s. 86 Katznelson gives the example of how in practice the gI Bill widened inequalities, since few african americans in either the north or the south were beneficiaries; thus american state policy was not neutral but quite partial in its effects, as office holders will have appreciated.
the white supremacist racial order was maintained at key points by southern political control of Congress. But citing southern influence insufficiently explains how the segregationist order was accommodated and fostered in federal government from the 1920s and 1930s: in this setting it was bureaucratic autonomy at work, defining the contours of the american state. for instance, federal bureaucrats willingly engaged in the policies fostering and extending racial residential segregation of the sort permitting, from the 1940s, the development concurrently of all-white suburbs outside major cities and overwhelmingly african american ghettos within the same cities. federal housing agencies engaged in systematic racial structuring of mortgage applications, using the instrument of "redlining"-an assessment of property valuation that hinged on the presence of black americans-to prevent african americans becoming home owners, a preference consistent with many white northerners.
87
Putting an end to this segregated state, institutionalized in national government between the 1880s and 1960s, necessitated forceful execu- 84 King and tuck 2007. 85 King and smith 2005. 86 Katznelson 2005; lieberman 2002a; mettler 2002; rung 2002 . 87 King 2007b, 189-99; massey and denton 1993; Katz, stern, and fader, 2005. tive action designing and enforcing equal rights of citizenship. the american state (including the Justice department, the supreme Court, the presidency, and eventually the Congress) became an agent of racial transformation because it confirmed in legislation such as the Civil rights act 1964 and the Voting rights act 1965 certain basic rights to be enjoyed by all citizens no matter where they lived in the united states; and it provided the resources to enforce these standards-all of this in the supposedly "stateless" united states.
underlining such expansionist expressions of national state power is the articulation and maintenance of common standards, be these in social policy such as education, civil rights such as voting rights, administrative devices for industrial organization, or compensatory measures for historical injustices such as affirmative action. often contested and never constant in content, such manifestations of the national state demonstrate how inescapable the institution of an american state has become to american politics. In fact, it has always had this salience for race but because its effects were taken for granted, many analysts overlooked state policy. 88 for over half a century the federal government proved unwilling to enforce voting and civil rights throughout the united states despite the powers vested in it by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments; and it engaged actively in policies that not only maintained but even extended a segregationist racial order.
the new synthesis? comparative puzzles and the american state this assessment of the american state's weaknesses generates a profound puzzle: if the united states is "stateless"-or, more precisely, if the american state is limited in so many of these conventional ways in which stateness is conventionally measured-how are we to account for the scale of its activity and growth into a powerful institutional force, at home and abroad, for good and ill? examples of this efficacy include the expansion of affirmative action programs in employment from the 1960s despite the relatively underresourced and weak institutional arrangements put in place by the Civil rights act of 1964 to achieve these goals. this success demonstrates both the dangers of assuming the national state lacks well-placed institutional and bureaucratic actors capable of pursuing national public policy to achieve so-cial engineering reforms and the costs of assuming that because the american state appears to lack the common traits of stateness found in comparable advanced democracies it therefore does not possess nationally distinct public-private associational arrangements capable of delivering policy. 89 It is one achievement of recent american political development scholarship that it has chosen to flesh out the distinct ways in which the american state has operated, rather than invoking statelessness as an excuse for ignoring the exercise of national authority and power.
In this work american political development scholars find valuable points of convergence with the emerging comparative politics of the state that we have identified. the works we have surveyed seek to broaden the notions of stateness and state building that inform the comparative study of political processes and institutions. examining these works side by side-despite their differences in substantive focus, geographical scope, and analytical approach-reveals a common thread to which we call attention. Whether self-consciously or not, these works collectively take a large step toward reclaiming the expansive and probingly complex multidimensional notion of stateness that J. P. nettl proposed in World Politics forty years ago. from the vantage point of the post-cold war, globally interdependent, post-9/11 world, we might differ with nettl in defining the dimensions of state, but these works suggest that we cannot gainsay his suggestion that the state's importance cannot be captured on a one-dimensional strong-weak continuum or through a model that builds centrally on a Weberian conception of coercive capacity located in centralized bureaucracies.
for the united states, this approach seems to us to offer great promise in unlocking some of the ironic mysteries that the american state poses to a now-mature generation of studies in american political development. despite nettl's conviction that the united states did not possess stateness, this perspective, advanced powerfully by the recent wave of comparative state-building studies, actually provides the architecture for a cogent analytical framework that offers some promise for american political development. Compared with the chief irony of american state building-the apparent emergence of state strength and capacity out of links with society rather than autonomy from itthis second irony-that it is nettl and his intellectual heirs who might provide the key to resolve the first-might seem modest. But it is a tribute to the acuity of nettl's framework that it can embrace such ironies and permit us to include the united states in comparative analysis in ways that enrich these studies and accounts of american political development. this enrichment requires, as we have argued, two major modifications to any stateness framework applied to the american case: first, an understanding and analytical integration of the fact that the american state was a segregated state until as recently as the early 1970s and, second, an understanding of the extent to which its regulatory form represents comparatively distinctive state-society associational patterns. these two additions to the stateness framework are prerequisites for analytical progress. 
